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The U.S. trade deficit is a major concern for the G-7 countries. However, it is unclear
whether their fiscal and monetary policies are effective in this regard. We examine the
relationship between the U.S. trade balance and the G-7 countries￿f policy variables by
constructing an eight-dimensional version of the structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
model. Our empirical results suggest that a reduction in the U.S. fiscal deficit is not such a
reliable instrument for reducing the U.S. trade imbalance. Contrastingly, monetary tightening
in the U.S. can reduce its trade deficit. Non-U.S. policy shocks are ineffective, while decline
in the U.S. dollar plays an important role in reducing the U.S. trade deficit.
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the global current account imbalances have attracted considerable attention 
in  the  international  financial  market. The  U.S. current  account  deficit  has  increased 
considerably, exceeding 6% of the GDP in 2006. Following the subprime crisis, the U.S. 
economy has decelerated and the U.S. dollar has declined. On the other hand, the U.S. 
current account deficit decreased to 5% of the GDP in the third quarter of 2007. 
However,  the  current  level  of  the  U.S.  deficit  remains  high,  and  considerable 
attention  has  been  paid  to  the  causes  and  sustainability  of  the  resulting  global 
imbalances.   
Global imbalances constitute a key issue in international cooperation, and it has often 
been a topic of focus among the group of the seven leading industrial nations (known as 
the  Group  of  Seven  or  G-7).  In  addition,  many  observers  have  indicated  several 
measures for adjusting the global imbalances. However, they are not necessarily certain 
as to which measure would be the most effective and the manner in which the related 
variables could change in case the unwinding of global imbalances occurs.   
There exists abundant theoretical and empirical literature regarding the determination 
of current account balances. In particular, policymakers have considerable interest in the 
impact that fiscal and monetary policies have on the current account. Several studies 
consider the U.S. budget deficit to be an important factor in the economy’s external 
imbalances  (Cline,  2005;  Chinn,  2005;  Chinn  and  Ito,  2005).  In  other  words,  it  is 
believed that if the U.S. government reduces its fiscal deficit, the global imbalance will 
unwind. However, other analyses based on simulation models suggest that the budget 
deficit may not, in fact, play a central role (Erceg et al., 2005; Ferguson, 2005). For 
example, Erceg et al. (2005) find that a 1% increase in the fiscal deficit expands the 
current account deficit by 0.2%. Historically,  movements  in the general government 
surplus and the current account balance have rarely been identical (Bems et al., 2007). 
Kim and Roubini (2004) discovered that government deficits and spending shocks have 
a  positive  effect on trade  balance.  Bussiere  et  al.  (2005)  performed  a  cross-country 
analysis of current account imbalances and government deficits and discovered that a 
1% reduction in a country’s government deficit leads to less than a 0.1% improvement 
in its current account. 
The fact that fiscal policy has a fairly small effect on trade balance indicates that 
private demand is negatively correlated with public demand (government expenditure). 
In general, it can be considered that larger fiscal deficits tend to penalize growth. Van 
Aarle and Garretsen (2003) found some favorable evidence supporting the existence of 
a  non-linear  effect  in  the  short-run  effects  of  government  consumption  on  private   2
spending. Carmignani (2008) demonstrates that fiscal policy has Keynesian effects in 
transition economies and non-Keynesian effects in high-income OECD economies. 
With respect to monetary policy, monetary expansion will lead to an increase in the 
domestic demand for imports, resulting in the short-run worsening of the trade balance. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  monetary  expansion  also  leads  to  a  nominal  exchange  rate 
depreciation,  contributing  to  the  long-run  improvement  of  the  trade  balance  (Kim, 
2001). 
In this paper, we explore effective measures for reducing the U.S.’s external deficits. 
In particular, we focus on the policy variables of the G-7 countries, namely, the U.S., 
Japan, Germany, the U.K., France, Italy, and Canada. Based on our empirical analyses, 
we will suggest the most effective measures that policymakers should employ.   
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  explains  the  VAR  modeling  and 
empirical  methodology. Section 3 presents a preliminary analysis and the estimation 
results. Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes the paper. 
   
2. Methodology 
We take into consideration several factors that are likely to affect the global current 
account  imbalances.  We  use  a  structural  vector  autoregression  (SVAR)  model  to 
estimate their effects. 
In our VAR model, we consider the following eight factors: (1) U.S. fiscal policy 
(USG), (2) U.S. monetary policy (FF), (3) fiscal policies of the non-U.S. G-7 countries   
(OGC) (4) policy rates of the non-U.S. G-7 countries (OR) (5) U.S. nominal effective 
exchange  rate  (ER),  (6)  U.S.  real  GDP  (USY)  (7)  real  GDP  of  the  non-U.S.  G-7 
countries (OY), and (8) ratio of the U.S. trade balance to GDP (BOP).   
USG  was  obtained  from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  and  Table  3.2  of  the 
federal  government’s  records  of  the  current  receipts  and  expenditures.  The  fiscal 
balance was calculated as a percentage of the GDP.    FF represents the federal funds 
rate, which was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB). Kim (2001) and Bems 
et  al.  (2007)  used  the  nominal  data  to  estimate  the  Fed’s  monetary  policy.  OGC 
represents the ratio of government consumption to GDP for the non-U.S. G-7 countries, 
obtained  from  OECD-statistics.  To  determine  OR,  we  calculated  the  G-7  countries’ 
policy rates by weighting their individual key rates by their respective nominal GDPs. 
Each country’s policy rate and GDP was obtained from Datastream. ER is the nominal 
foreign exchange value of the dollar (for the major currencies), acquired from the FRB. 
BOP represents the net trade balance/GDP ratio. Data on the U.S. balance of goods and 
services was obtained from the U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, Bureau   3
of Economic Analysis.   
Our identifying assumptions involve the contemporaneous coefficient matrix and can 
be summarized in the following equations, which link the reduced-form errors to the 
structural shocks .   
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In  the  above  equations,  j e   represent  the  residuals  in  the  reduced-form  VAR 
equations and  j u   represent the structural disturbances.   
The first equation depicts the U.S. real GDP. We treat USY as being exogenous to the 
policy variables and assume that 
0 ) 18 ( ) 17 ( ) 16 ( ) 15 ( ) 14 ( ) 13 ( ) 12 (               c c c c c c c . 
The second equation depicts the real GDPs of the non-U.S. G-7 countries. Based on 
the global business cycle, we consider their GDPs to be correlated with the U.S. GDP 
( 0 ) 21 (   c ).   
The third equation depicts the U.S. fiscal policy. We treat USG such that it is affected 
by the U.S. business cycle. The government budget balance, particularly the revenues, is 
pro-cyclical. For example, if the U.S. GDP increases, the U.S. fiscal account will also 
improve ( 0 ) 31 (   c ). 
The fourth equation depicts the U.S. monetary reaction function. FF will be raised if 
the real GDP increases to a level above the target level of the FRB. Thus, the expected 
sign of c(41) is positive. Further,  ) 43 ( c   depicts the reaction of the monetary policy 
(FF) to the fiscal policy (USG). The sign can be either positive or negative. If Fed’s 
monetary policy accommodates fiscal expansions, the sign of the coefficient is positive 
( 0 ) 43 (   c ). However, if the interdependence between the two policies is asymmetric, 
the sign of the coefficient is negative ( 0 ) 43 (   c ). We assume that FF is not directly   4
affected by foreign factors.     
The fifth equation depicts the government consumption levels of the non-U.S. G-7 
countries. We regard these to be directly affected by both their respective GDPs and the 
U.S. fiscal policy. We assume that the U.S. fiscal policy and the non-U.S. G-7 countries’ 
fiscal policies are correlated because the U.S. is the world’s largest open economy. The 
expected signs of c(52) and c(53) are negative.   
The sixth equation depicts the policy rates of the non-U.S. G-7 countries. The policy 
rates are assumed to be directly affected by both their respective business cycles and the 
U.S. monetary policy. The expected signs of c(62) and c(64) are positive. Furthermore, 
the policy rates move simultaneously with their fiscal policies. The sign of c(65) can be 
either positive or negative. 
The seventh equation depicts the U.S. effective exchange rate. First, we assume that 
the movements in the exchange rate reflect the business conditions ( 0 ) 72 ( , 0 ) 71 (     c c ) 
or  the  interest  rates  ( 0 ) 76 ( , 0 ) 74 (     c c ).  That  is,  the  U.S.  dollar  will  appreciate 
consequent to both an increase in the U.S. GDP or federal funds rate and decreases in 
the non-U.S. GDPs or non-U.S. interest rates. Second, we consider that the change in 
the  dollar  rate  is  affected  by  the  U.S.  fiscal  account.  Many  empirical  analyses 
demonstrate that fiscal account deficits cause dollar appreciation according to the twin 
deficit hypothesis. However, Kim and Roubini (2004) find that fiscal account deficit 
shocks cause dollar depreciation according to the twin divergence hypothesis. Therefore, 
the signs of c(73) and c(75) can be either positive or negative.               
The last equation depicts the U.S. trade balance to GDP (BOP). We treat BOP such 
that it is affected by all the variables. An increase in the U.S. GDP, a decline in the 
non-U.S. GDPs, and dollar appreciation will deteriorate the U.S. trade account. Thus, 
the expected signs are as follows:  0 ) 87 ( , 0 ) 82 ( , 0 ) 81 (       c c c .   
On the other hand, on the basis of the twin deficit hypothesis or the positive relation 
that exists between the current account and government saving ( 0 ) 85 ( , 0 ) 83 (     c ), the 
current account and fiscal account are correlated in terms of the identity relationship 
between them. 
Moreover, there are co-movements between the financial account (=–current account) 
and interest rate. That is, an increase in the interest rate will expand the capital inflow, 
which in turn, will result in an increase in the current account deficit. Thus, the expected 
signs are as follows: 0 ) 86 ( , 0 ) 84 (     c c . 
We added a linear trend in the VAR model. Our VAR model was estimated with four   5
lags
1. We used quarterly observations from 1982:2 to 2007:3
2. The variables USY, OY, 
and ER are converted into natural logarithms. Prior to conducting the SVAR analysis, 
we tested the order of integration for all the time series. We considered all the variables 
to be integrated to the order of one. Our model is estimated in first differences
3. 
 
3. Estimation results 
3.1 The estimated contemporaneous effects 
Table 1 illustrates the estimated contemporaneous effects of the specification shown 
in equation (1). The specification is over-identified; however, the likelihood ratio (LR) 
test for over-identification verifies the validity of our restrictions. Overall, the results 
support the validity of the proposed model. In the specifications, many coefficients have 
the  expected  signs.  In  particular,  the  signs  of  ) 43 ( c ,  ) 52 ( c ,  ) 53 ( c ,  ) 62 ( c ,  ) 64 ( c , 
and  ) 76 ( c   are significant at the 1% level.     
The result wherein the sign of  ) 43 ( c   is positive indicates that the Fed’s monetary 
policy is complementary to the government’s policy. 
The empirical result wherein the sign of  ) 52 ( c   is negative indicates that the fiscal 
policies of the non-U.S. countries are correlated with their respective business cycles. 
Thus, if the economy is robust, government expenditure will be less. 
The  estimation  result  wherein  the  sign  of  c(53)  is  significant  indicates  that  the 
overseas fiscal policies are also complementary to the U.S. government’s policy. The 
result that the sign of c(62) is significant indicates that the non-U.S. monetary policies 
are affected by the respective business cycles. The sign of  ) 64 ( c   is positive at the 1% 
significance  level.  This  empirical  result  indicates  that  there  exists  a  channel  of 
international  spillover  effects  of  monetary  policy.  Finally,  the  sign  of  c(76)  is 
unexpectedly positive at the 1% significance level, which is puzzling. The reason why 
this paradoxical correlation occurs may be that our specifications are subject to the price 
puzzle; under monetary contraction, the price level increases unexpectedly. 
                                                   
1  Although  the  lag  length  tests  (Akaike  information  criterion  (AIC)  and  Schwarz 
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC)) indicated that such long lags would be optimal, 
we chose a lag length of four. Our basic conclusion did not depend on lag length. 
2  Several previous studies were conducted from 1982:2 onward. According to Clarida 
et al. (2000), there has been a change in the formulation of the monetary policy. Fisher 
(2006) and Bems et al. (2007) examined the factors affecting the U.S. external 
imbalances based on samples obtained from 1982:2 onward.   
3  We checked for the possibility that a six-variable system might be cointegrated. 
Vector cointegrating regressions did not indicate stationary residuals based on the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test suggested by Engle and Granger (1987).     6
3.2 Impulse response 
We consider the policy variables that are important in explaining the policy variable 
BOP.    Figure 1 displays the responses of BOP to a one-standard deviation innovation 
of  a  particular  structural  shock  to  all  the  variables  over  a  twenty-quarter  period.  It 
includes ±2 standard error bands. With respect to the U.S. fiscal policy shock (Shock 3), 
a reduction in the U.S. budget deficit could improve the U.S. net trade balance. A 1% 
increase in USG leads to a 0.1% improvement in the U.S. trade deficit/GDP in the first 
four  quarters  and  0.2%  improvement  in  the  first  2  years.  This  estimation  result  is 
consistent with that in Erceg et al. (2005). The effect is not statistically significant.   
Regarding  the  U.S.  monetary  policy  shock  (Shock  4), tightening  of  the  monetary 
policy can decrease the U.S. net trade deficit. This result is inconsistent with that in Kim 
(2001). A 1% hike in the federal funds rate leads to a 0.4% improvement in the U.S. net 
trade deficit/GDP in the first 2 years. 
As regards the non-U.S. G-7 countries’ policy shocks (Shocks 5 and 6), the effects are 
not statistically significant although the signs are as expected. Interestingly, an increase 
in OGC can expand the U.S. trade deficit. This implies that an increase in OGC can 
decrease  the  real  GDPs  of  the  non-U.S.  G-7  countries  (non-Keynesian  effects
4), 
resulting  in  improvements  in  their  trade  accounts  or  deterioration  in  the  U.S.  trade 
account. Although monetary easing in the non-U.S. G-7 countries can cause the U.S. 
dollar  to  appreciate  in  the  long  run,  it  can  also  increase  domestic  demand  in  the 
countries in the short run. Thus, monetary easing by these countries can help decrease 
the U.S. trade deficit. Finally, with an ER shock (Shock 7), the depreciation of the dollar 
could improve the net trade balance. A 10% depreciation in ER will lead to a 0.7% 
improvement in the US net trade deficit/GDP in the first 2 years and 1.1% improvement 
in the first 3 years
5. 
The impulse response results indicate that a reduction in the U.S. fiscal deficit is not 
such  a  reliable  instrument  for  reducing  the  U.S.  imbalances,  since  the  effect of  the 
adjustment is not significant. However, monetary tightening in the U.S. can help reduce 
the U.S. trade deficit. Further, the most effective policy appears to be dollar depreciation. 
                                                   
4 Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) report on the basis of a sample of OECD countries over 
the period 1970–1992. While they find that the fiscal policy has Keynesian effects 
during normal times, it has non-Keynesian effects outside of the normal times. Our 
estimation result may have been caused by the fact that several of the non-U.S. G-7 
countries were experiencing fiscal structural problems and were not within the normal 
times during our estimation periods.         
5  When we used the real effective exchange rate, we found that the impact on BOP was 
larger.     7
Our results are robust for many alternative specifications such as the one in which the 
order of the eight variables is reversed.   
Next, based on the results of the impulse response, we suggest the  measures that 
should be employed for unwinding the U.S. trade imbalance. The forecast error variance 
decomposition is presented in Table 2. The relatively effective measures for adjusting 
the U.S. trade account involve the U.S. fiscal policy (shock 3), U.S. monetary policy 
(shock 4), and change in the U.S. dollar (shock 7).   
Policymakers  cannot  directly  affect  the  GDP.  We  consider,  for  example,  the 
combination of U.S. fiscal tightening and a hike in the federal funds rate. Specifically, 
the sizes of the given shocks of these variables are as follows: 2% increase in USG and 
2% increase in the federal funds rate. Should these policy shocks be applied, the U.S. 
trade deficit/GDP would improve by only 1.2% in 2 years. However, at the same time, if 
the shock of a 10% depreciation for RE is applied, the U.S. trade deficit/GDP would 
improve by 1.9% in 2 years. 
4. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to examine the relationship between the U.S. trade 
balance  and  the  policy  variables  of  the  G-7  countries  by  constructing  an 
eight-dimensional  version  of  the  SVAR  model.  Several  important  conclusions  were 
derived from our analysis. 
First, our empirical results suggest that a reduction in the U.S. fiscal deficit is not 
such  a  reliable  instrument  for  reducing  the  U.S.  imbalances,  since  the  effect of  the 
adjustment  is  not  significant.  However,  monetary  tightening  in  the  U.S.  can  more 
effectively reduce the U.S. trade deficit.   
Second,  with  respect  to  non-U.S.  policy  shocks,  reduction  in  government 
consumption cannot help reduce the U.S. trade deficit. It is necessary to examine the 
effect  of  private  demand  (investment or  consumption)  on  the  U.S. trade  account  in 
future studies. In addition, we cannot rely on the adjustment effect of the monetary 
policies of the non-U.S. countries. The estimation results wherein the policies of the 
non-U.S  G-7  countries  are  not  significant  may  be  consistent  with  the  fact  that  the 
counterpart of the large U.S. current account deficit is no longer surpluses primarily in 
Germany and Japan but rather a surplus in the emerging market countries as a group. An 
analysis incorporating the policy factors of the emerging countries remains a challenge 
for future studies.   
Third,  decline  in  the  U.S.  dollar  plays  an  important role  in  attaining  the  goal  of 
reducing the U.S. trade deficit. The dollar decline shock implies that the G-7 countries 
should not intervene either.     8
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Table 1    Estimated Contemporaneous Effects 
Expected Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
sign
C(21) + 0.183 0.079 2.333 0.020 **
C(31) + 5.321 12.239 0.435 0.664
C(41) + 18.409 9.577 1.922 0.055 *
C(43) ? 0.203 0.077 2.624 0.009 ***
C(52) - -0.733 0.212 -3.468 0.001 ***
C(53) - -0.006 0.001 -4.648 0.000 ***
C(62) + 20.973 7.050 2.975 0.003 ***
C(64) + 0.204 0.054 3.761 0.000 ***
C(65) ? 0.951 2.875 0.331 0.741
C(71) + 0.372 0.586 0.635 0.525
C(72) - -1.726 0.775 -2.229 0.026 **
C(73) ? 0.007 0.005 1.430 0.153
C(74) + -0.005 0.006 -0.870 0.384
C(75) ? -0.461 0.322 -1.432 0.152
C(76) - 0.039 0.010 3.892 0.000 ***
C(81) - 6.483 4.893 1.325 0.185
C(82) + -7.381 6.614 -1.116 0.265
C(83) + 0.067 0.043 1.562 0.118
C(84) - -0.051 0.052 -0.982 0.326
C(85) + -3.627 2.714 -1.336 0.182
C(86) + 0.144 0.091 1.588 0.112
C(87) - -0.249 0.826 -0.301 0.763
C(11) + 0.004 0.000 14.283 0.000 ***
C(22) + 0.004 0.000 14.283 0.000 ***
C(33) + 0.547 0.038 14.283 0.000 ***
C(44) + 0.428 0.030 14.283 0.000 ***
C(55) + 0.008 0.001 14.283 0.000 ***
C(66) + 0.245 0.017 14.283 0.000 ***
C(77) + 0.025 0.002 14.283 0.000 ***
C(88) + 0.209 0.015 14.283 0.000 ***
Log likelihood  1294.769
LR test for over-identification: 
Chi-square(6)  9.306826 Probability 0.157
Note: *significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level
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Table 2      Variance Decomposition of D(BOP):        : 
 Period Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 Shock5 Shock6 Shock7 Shock8
1 2.58 0.12 4.13 0.20 1.27 2.19 0.08 89.43
2 7.09 0.12 7.74 0.16 1.53 3.92 4.45 74.98
3 6.85 0.14 7.58 2.35 2.04 3.72 5.90 71.42
4 5.99 0.17 10.93 9.10 2.35 3.49 5.14 62.83
5 5.53 6.67 10.28 10.79 2.34 3.13 4.62 56.63
6 6.31 7.51 10.30 10.36 2.22 2.99 6.27 54.04
7 6.60 8.68 10.25 10.33 2.15 2.99 6.76 52.24
8 8.21 8.86 9.91 10.13 2.08 3.28 6.93 50.59
9 8.09 8.75 9.73 10.12 2.23 3.30 8.15 49.64
10 8.17 8.85 9.61 10.01 2.42 3.39 8.59 48.94
11 8.15 8.82 9.58 10.00 2.56 3.43 8.72 48.75
12 8.14 8.82 9.57 9.94 2.72 3.45 8.96 48.40
13 8.13 8.79 9.54 9.90 2.84 3.44 9.14 48.22
14 8.13 8.77 9.50 9.87 3.00 3.44 9.23 48.06
15 8.12 8.77 9.48 9.86 3.04 3.44 9.32 47.97
16 8.12 8.76 9.47 9.85 3.06 3.43 9.43 47.89
17 8.11 8.75 9.49 9.84 3.09 3.43 9.47 47.83
18 8.10 8.74 9.51 9.83 3.09 3.42 9.52 47.79
19 8.10 8.74 9.51 9.83 3.09 3.42 9.55 47.76
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Accumulated Response of D(BOP) to Shock8
Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Shock 1: US GDP shock; Shock 2: Non-US GDP shock; 
Shock 3: Fiscal balance shock; Shock 4: FF rate shock;   
Shock 5: Overseas fiscal shock; Shock 6: Overseas policy rate shock;   
Shock 7: ER shock; Shock 8: U.S. trade balance shock   